Although they constitute a tiny minority of the overall American makeup (less than 0.5 percent), Arab Americans have become an increasingly visible community over the last few decades. Their emergence as one of the most successful minorities in the United States could be explained by a bunch of achievements they have made in different domains: education, jobs, and politics. But, many would equally attribute their success to a strong belief in the American dream and a manifested will to assimilate.
Introduction
Although Arab Americans have emerged as a visible group over the last few decades, they still trigger a number of questions regarding their numbers, their ethno-religious makeup, their political leanings, especially their assimilation into the mainstream fabric and their sense of belonging. The limited quantity of studies conducted so far about them revealed disparate information about a community that is widely misunderstood and constantly changing. This paper aims to investigate the sweeping support Arab American voters demonstrated to the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, in 2008 and 2012. It analyzes their vote, namely their drift away from the Republican Party since 2002 as a consequence of Bush's new security measures, identifies issues of common interest to their sub-communities, and assesses the degree of political engagement and collaboration among their component members and their respective advocacy groups. This study, eventually, tries to gauge Obama's record, especially to measure the gap between his pre-election rhetoric in favor of Arab Muslims constituents, and concrete actions he took to shake up the status quo in that direction.
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Source: Zogby International (2002) The same applies in the other way round. Out of an estimated Muslim population of about 3.3 million in 2015 (that is less than one percent of the total U.S. population), roughly one-quarter (26 percent) report an Arab descent. According to recent polls (see Graph 3), the single largest component of American Muslims are South-Central and Southeast Asians (35 percent), followed by African Americans (30 percent) (Allied Media Corp., 2002) . (Note 2) Thus, contrary to prevalent misconceptions regarding their community, American Muslims are today not only one of the most ethnically and racially diverse groups in the United States, but also one of the fastest growing ethno-religious minorities. Pursuant to projections by the Pew Research Center, the U.S. Muslim population is likely to grow even faster than those of other faiths (mainly Hindu and Jewish), reaching 8.1 million people (that is 2.1 percent of the total population) by 2050, an increase it basically attributes to an influx of arrivals from conflict zones in the Middle East (namely Syria and Iraq), and to a higher birth rate among Muslim women (Pew Research Center [PRC] , 2016).
Firmly determined to take their own affairs in hand, and regardless of their reduced numbers, Arab Americ ans could even vindicate contribution to the American success story. In fact, in view of its upward socio-economic mobility, this is one of the communities that has banked on the American dream and that has made significant progress both at the educational and occupational levels. According to estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau, 89 percent of Arab American adults hold at least a high school diploma, 45 percent (compared with 27 percent of Americans at large) have a bachelor's degree or higher, and 18 percent possess a postgraduate degree, that is nearly twice the American average. With regard to occupation, Arab Americans seem to be doing as well as the average American, with 73 percent employed in the service sector, but with an overall median income that is higher than the national average ($56,331, in 2008, compared with $51,369 for the average American) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). Finally, when it comes to personal identification, a relative majority of the Arab community members (both Christians and Muslims) self-identify as Arab American (43 percent), against 19 percent who mention their country of origin, and 19 percent who indicate both. As reflected in Table 1 , 54 percent of Arab Americans describe themselves by their ethnicity and make no reference of their religion (AAI, 2016). Country  of  Origin  19  18  22  20  20  15  23  10  29  15  14   Arab American  43  41  51  45  37  50  35  49  29  50  54  By Both  19  19  17  21  18  15  31  10  20  9  25  Neither  18  20  10  12  24  20  9  29  20  25  6  Not Sure  2  2  *  2  2  *  2  2  2  1  * Source: Zogby International (2016) 
Party Identification and Voting Patterns
When it comes to politics, the Arab American minority could be anything but a monolith. Indeed, even though Arab participation and involvement in the decision-making process is a recent story, Arab Americans have rarely acted as a bloc, nor have they agreed and worked on a common agenda that defends the bulk of their interests. (Note 3) What we have, instead, is a community often divided across national, ethnic, and religious lines, that acts as a single group only to respond to immediate challenges menacing its core interests. So, even though they arrived as early as the 1880s, Arab Americans had to wait until the late 1960s to self-identify as such, a major shift widely attributed to the 1967 Six-Day War that laid bare American partisanship in favor of the state of Israel (Suleiman, 1994) .
However, while indelibly far-reaching when used as a tool to enhance exchange and promote social cooperation between the different component groups, especially to perpetuate a common cultural heritage, group diversity could produce but limited results in terms of political achievements. It could even hinder any political initiative aimed to defend the community's vital interests, and dwarf the group's visibility as a new political force to reckon with. In terms of party identification as well as top priority issues likely to galvanize the Arab vote, one could evoke a plurality of Arab constituencies fragmented across diverse lines, ranging from Christians, Muslims, native -born, foreign-born, onto new and old immigrants.
As a matter of fact, while by no means a voting bloc, Arab American voters have frequently changed sides, based on party platforms, candidates' charisma and leadership, and what both have to offer to the constituency as a whole. Even though they do not pack as big an electoral group as Hispanics, for instance, who account for 17 percent of the population, or African Americans (13 percent), they have become aware that their vote could be decisive in a close-call race. In effect, their concentration in a handful of battleground states (representing about 5 percent of the vote in Michigan, 2 percent in Virginia, 1.5 to 2 percent in Ohio, 1.5 percent in Florida, and 1.5 percent in Pennsylvania) could impact the general outcome of any presidential election (AAI, 2008 Table 2 ). Table 3 , Arab Americans chose to vote for the Democratic candidate because of a variety of reasons, mostly his stance on domestic issues.
Contrary to his Republican adversary who stressed status quo in terms of general policy, Obama's message of change resonated on a large scale with Arab American voters who felt more aligned with the issues and values the Democratic candidate championed. Now, one could speak of a single Arab constituency that not only felt alienated by the GOP perspectives that no longer spoke to them, but also repulsed by a growing Islamophobic rhetoric within that party, that "scapegoated" their entire community and swept Muslims and Christians alike. As a result, the gap that once demarcated Christian and Muslim, native-born and immigrant, new and old immigrant, disappeared, giving way to a semblance of group cohesion much needed to respond to new challenges and threats. Source: Zogby International (2008) Notwithstanding, rallying massively behind a common agenda defending Arab vital interests does not and in any way imply that the members of the Arab community vote as a bloc. (Note 6) Similarly, adapting its strategy to changing political contexts and cleavages to defend a wide array of issues provides a supplementary evidence that the group now called "Arab Americans" is not a single-issue constituency. Accordingly, their vote does not differ that much from the vote of other mainstream Americans with whom they share the same concerns regarding the future of the nation, on top of them jobs and the economy, healthcare, education, and national security. Even though they seem more sensitive to certain subjects pertaining to the American foreign policy, namely the Arab-Israeli peace process, the invasion of Iraq, and the civil war in Syria, their vote is neither confined to, nor dictated by a compelling pro -Arab agenda.
As evidenced in Table 4 , asked to cite the two most important issues in the 2008 election, 79 percent of Arab American voters named jobs or the economy, while only 38 cited war and peace in Iraq. Concomitantly, when asked which candidate would best handle these issues, 69 percent who cited the economy and 65 who cited war in Iraq favored Obama over McCain. Unexpectedly, Palestine, as a focus, ranked only eighth among Arab American top priorities. This could be explained by the major shift that deeply affected the overall Arab strategy, and that came as an immediate consequence of the 9/11 shock. In truth, Arab American leaders realized that galvanizing their energies around such a controversial issue in a new context of war on terror and Arab and Muslim stigmatization would bring about only limited results and would further marginalize their efforts fighting for their civil liberties (AAI, 2002). Tables 5 and 6 , strong majorities in both the Jewish and Arab communities manifested full-fledged support to the right of both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a secure and independent state of their own, but both remained largely unaware of these common views and underestimated each other's support for a two-state solution (ZI, 2007) .
Interestingly, even though the Arab-Israeli conflict matters much for Arab American voters, it could by no means be placed ahead of their concerns for domestic issues, notably their resolve to defend their civil l iberties. Arab American leaders understood that whatever consensus they might reach at this level, they could never impact national policies in this regard, especially countering the pro-Israel lobby, led by the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). On balance, the 2012 face-off was not very different from the previous one. Issues that drained Arab votes were much the same. Like most Americans, an overwhelming portion of Arab Americans (82 percent) considered jobs and the economy as the most critical issues facing the nation (see Table 7 ). Foreign policy came as the second most cited issue (27 percent). This could be explained by a strong connection Arab constituents have maintained with the ir countries of origin. Concomitantly, at least 80 percent of Arab voters considered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict important to their vote, and nearly the same percentage rated U.S. outreach to the Arab and Muslim worlds ( Ibid. The "Cairo Speech," as it came to be known and which won him the Peace Nobel Prize in 2009, gave the new president an international aura and conferred upon him a bona fide legitimacy to urgently address hot global issues that his predecessors had been unable to elucidate, namely handling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ending U.S. presence in Iraq with diplomacy, and opening channels of dialogue with Iran over its nuclear program. At the domestic level, he was expected to demonstrate strong leadership managing jobs and the economy, countering budget deficit, expanding health care coverage, investing in public education, and ending surveillance and racial profiling in airpo rts.
With the unforeseen victory of Donald Trump in 2016, and the coming back of Republicans to the White House, Arab Americans turned a new page in their history in the United States. Seven years after the "Cairo Speech," time has come for them to size up Obama's record after two administrations exceptionally rich with eventful and turbulent history, especially discern action from rhetoric. For, in addition to promises he made at the domestic and foreign policy levels, Obama had to grapple with challenges that cropped up over the course of his mandate, namely defeating ISIS in Iraq and neighboring countries, ending the conflict in Syria, and meeting the humanitarian needs of the Syrian refugees.
All in all, while it is premature to cast a steadfast look at Obama's legacy, as part of it could only be assessed in the long run, it is worthwhile to draw a number of firsthand conclusions, after two terms in office eminently fraught with uncontested accomplishments as well as irrefutable failures. From an Arab American perspective, even if his supporters and detractors alike recognize exogenous constraints that may have hindered his plans for action and over which he had no control, they just wanted to make sure that the 44 th president was worth the trust many among them vested in him.
In effect, even though he inherited a disastrous economic situation at home, and an extremely tense context outside, a context further fueled by unrelenting regional conflicts, civil wars, and sectarian rivalries, President Obama could boast quitting office with highly praised achievements. Overall, not only has he left America in a better shape than his predecessor, but also took far-reaching measures likely to affect generations to come. Obama ended his second administration remarkably popular among a strong majority of Arab Americans (60 percent) who gave him a good or excellent job performance rating (see Table 8 ), compared with a nationwide approval rating of over 55 percent (Edwards-Levy, 2017). Source: Zogby Analytics (2016) More than anything else, Obama was credited for getting the nation out of the doldrums of one of the worst financial disasters since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and that severely hit the country in 2008. What is more, under his presidency, nearly 15 million jobs were created, bringing the unemployment rate from a high of 10 percent in October 2009 to just around 5 percent by the end of his second mandate. (Note 13) Likewise, the 2010's Patient Protection and Affordable care Act that extended health care coverage to some 23 million Americans, gave the former president overall positive scores. To 57 percent of Arab Americans, Obama did a great job handling U.S. economic policy, a top priority that, to a large extent, motivated their vote in 2008 and 2012 (see Table 9 ). Source: Zogby Analytics (2016) Notwithstanding, while Obama's domestic achievements could be celebrated on a large scale, reflecting his engagement to enhance economic growth and reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots, his foreign policy accomplishments, by contrast, are another story. As a matter of fact, only 44 percent among Arab Americans had a positive view regarding his handling of U.S. foreign policy (see Table 10 ). To some among his staunchest critics, the former head of the executive even left behind him a less safe and more destabilized world than it had been in 2008, when his Republican predecessor handed him the keys to the Oval Office. Source: Zogby Analytics (2016) Admittedly, Arab and Muslim enthusiasm for Obama's presidency proved short-lived as the latter not only failed to keep most of his promises, namely ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, closing the controversial prison at Guantanamo Bay, and taking a hard line against terrorism, but also proved ineffective as he did little or nothing to bring about real change and stop the war machine in the Middle East. Furthermore, to a sizable number of Arab Americans and American Muslims, his political and diplomatic choices during his two terms in office proved short-sighted, as the candidate they supported in both elections turned out to be that kind of leader who places realpolitik ahead of personal convictions.
Amongst others, Obama was blamed for inflaming hostilities in the Arab and Muslim worlds toward the United States when he decided to carry out a relentless drone program in Pakistan and Yemen that resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians. In 2016 alone, American drones dropped more than 26,000 bombs on Muslim countries, that is three every single hour of every single day (Werlman, 2017) . Similarly, in an attempt to break completely with Bush's policy, favoring war over diplomacy, Obama duplicated many of his predecessor's mistakes. For instance, his premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, in 2009, further exacerbated sectarian tensions in the region and ushered in the rise of ISIS and a myriad of local jihadist groups.
However, Iraq was not the only testing ground for Obama's foreign policy. Syria was another case in point. In effect, his decision to backtrack on overthrowing Assad's regime, ignoring his "red line" against the latter, was, according to his Arab American detractors, a supplementary evidence of his inconsistency handling complicated issues. The same could be said about his support of military intervention in Libya, in 2011, to oust Qaddafi and his regime from power. Not only it, in their view, utterly failed to bring about the hoped-for democracy, but also plunged the country in a state of chaos and lawlessness with no end in sight. (Eadeh, 2017) .
On the whole, although Arab Americans have been among those disappointed by the Obama episode, and some of them even translated their disillusionment by a vote for Donald Trump in 2016 (26 percent) (Note 14), a majority among them (59 percent) still hold a positive attitude regarding his policies toward the Arab world (see Table 11 ) (AAI, 2016). Table 12 ). Source: Zogby Analytics (2016)
Concluding Remarks
Arab Americans are one of the least studied groups in the United States. They have become visible only over the last few decades when they decided to take their own affairs in hand and defend their vital interests. Regardless of their small size or how they self-identify, they have become aware that to get a fair hearing and trigger political and ethnic consciousness, they need first to achieve group cohesiveness.
Contrary to widely-held assumptions, Arab Americans do not constitute a voting bloc, nor do they promote single-issue politics with the Middle East conflict as a top priority. Typically volatile in their voting patterns and behavior, they have rarely galvanized their energies to support a single political party, let alone a single presidential candidate. Their massive rally behind Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 has been rather a precedent in their recent political history. The shift in party identification that, after 9/11, drifted away from the GOP substantive numbers of Arab activists, came in a new context of war on terror, and has been dictated by a plurality of factors. It came principally as response to a growing anti-Arab and anti-Muslim rhetoric that started to overbear the political discourse, especially within the Republican Party.
The Arab overwhelming support of Obama in both contests could also be explained by the Democratic candidate's commitment to issues the community members care more about, as mainstream U.S. citizens first (namely jobs, the economy, education, healthcare and security), and as adherents of their respective constituency (civil liberties, racial profiling in airports, an even-handed treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, closing Guantanamo, withdrawal from Iraq, and recently the Syrian quagmire). It is worth mentioning in this context that even though U.S. foreign policy matters much for them and, to certain degrees, determines their vote, to a sizable number among them, it could by no means overshadow domestic issues, or affect their resolve to defend their civil liberties.
On the whole, with the unanticipated victory of Donald Trump in 2016, Arab Americans came to close a singular chapter in their history in the United States. Actually, the end of the Obama's episode not only signaled the advent of a new era exceptionally fraught with doubt and uncertainty, but also gave way to an overall assessment of his two mandates, both at the domestic and foreign levels. To a significant number among them, Obama's presidency was far from being flawless. Despite noticeable accomplishments at the national level that deservedly scored him high political ratings by the end of his second administration, his foreign policy record, by contrast, has been dampened by unfulfilled promises and dashed hopes. To many of his disillusioned Arab supporters, the much praised president simply failed his mission, and had only to pass an unfinished business to his successor.
